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CENTER AND PERIPHERY IN ANTEBELLUM FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATION:  THE MULTIPLE FACES OF POPULAR 
CONTROL* 
Jerry L. Mashaw** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo make a basic claim in their 
new book:  all Presidents are essentially Unitarians.1  In one way or 
another, they all seek to have exclusive control over the executive 
power and to direct the activities of those in the executive branch.  
The evidence for this claim is a broad survey of governmental prac-
tice from the earliest days of the Republic to the twenty-first century.  
At this level, the Calabresi-Yoo claim is not terribly controversial.  A 
somewhat stronger claim, however, occasionally creeps into their dis-
cussion.  That stronger claim might be stated as an argument for the 
normative force of practice.  Because Presidents have consistently 
acted as if they were the exclusive seat of executive power, that prac-
tice should govern our constitutional understandings of the alloca-
tion of power within the federal government. 
This stronger claim is much more problematic.  To make it out, at 
least the following issues would need to be addressed:  What is the 
normative force of practice?  What practices count as having norma-
tive force?  And, how is practice to be interpreted?  Other papers at 
this conference address these questions and I have addressed the in-
terpretive issue in an earlier article.2  In this contribution I will leave 
those issues mostly to the side.  However, the title of this panel, “Pres-
idential and Popular Control of Bureaucratic Elites,” suggests an ob-
vious normative basis for linking presidential control of the bureauc-
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 1 See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (discussing the theory of the 
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racy with popular democracy.  Presidents are popularly elected.  
Hence, whatever the other arguments for presidential control of bu-
reaucratic elites, one is surely that it tends to implement popular con-
trol of the bureaucracy. 
I’m sympathetic to the basic thrust of this claim.3  But my purpose 
here is different.  I want to explore other meanings of popular con-
trol, and, in keeping with the historical orientation of this confer-
ence, how those other meanings were operationalized in the organi-
zation of the Early Republic.  For unitarianism has no exclusive claim 
to democratic legitimacy.  And, as we shall see, other ideas and me-
chanisms of popular control are competitive with the unitarian vision, 
both theoretically and as a matter of governmental operation.  The 
recognition that popular control has other meanings and is opera-
tionalized through devices that compete with presidential direction 
can provide a more realistic assessment of both the normative power 
and the practical reach of unitarianism, whatever the aspirations of 
antebellum Presidents, or their successors. 
To some degree this description of practices in the Early Republic 
is a retelling of the old story of the struggle between center and pe-
riphery in all substantial organizations—public or private.  But my 
narrative is not entirely descriptive.  Early practices were based upon 
normative considerations.  Americans then and now have been com-
mitted to multiple forms of popular control of government.  I will 
close therefore with some reflections on the degree to which these 
commitments, notwithstanding their competition with unitary presi-
dential control, tend to increase popular control of governmental ac-
tion—which, in some sense, is what democracy is all about. 
II.  ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF POPULAR CONTROL 
Before proceeding to explore governmental practice in the ante-
bellum Republic, let me briefly describe some competing models of 
popular control of administration.  These four types of control ar-
rangements hardly exhaust the universe of organizational arrange-
ments with some claim to democratic legitimacy.  Nevertheless, each 
has a strong claim to provide a democratic pedigree for administra-
tive action, each has familiar contemporary examples, and each, as we 
shall see, was well represented in the organizational structures of the 
antebellum federal government. 
 
 3 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:  Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (discussing voters’ expectations and influences in presiden-
tial elections). 
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Assembly control of administration is an obvious first candidate.  
American administrative agencies famously have two principals, the 
President and Congress.  Congress, unlike the president, is popularly 
elected.  No Senator or Representative can take office without win-
ning the popular vote.  And, it is Congress, not the President, that 
creates, empowers, and funds administrative agencies.  If popular 
control of administration is wanted, Congress can—to some degree—
provide it.4  That Congress is motivated to do so seems obvious.  Con-
gress hardly lets any executive effort to act autonomously go unchal-
lenged.  When, in November 2008, Secretary Paulson sent Congress a 
three-page bill giving the Treasury virtually unlimited discretion to 
spend $700 billion, he got back a nearly 150-page statute, bristling 
with requirements for reports to Congress and with opportunities for 
congressional oversight and amendment.5 
Direct citizen involvement in administration is also a well-known 
technique for popular influence on, if not control of, administrative 
action.  Modern federal statutes often insist on public hearings, op-
portunities for notice and comment on agency rulemaking, the solici-
tation of advice from advisory committees, the use of standards previ-
ously formulated by private groups, and so on and on.  And, as a 
practical matter, Presidents would not appoint, and Congresses would 
not confirm, heads of major departments or agencies who were not 
broadly acceptable to the groups most directly affected by their ac-
tions.  Some citizen participation has a stronger legal character.  For 
example, citizens are given an independent right to enforce a num-
ber of federal environmental statutes in the face of government inac-
tion or recalcitrance. 
Decentralized administration of federal law is also a common fea-
ture of American governmental arrangements.  Occupational safety 
and health standards and environmental standards are implemented 
largely by state personnel.  And a huge proportion of federal spend-
ing on infrastructure projects and social welfare programs is carried 
out at the state and local level.  The use of nonfederal personnel to 
implement federal programs is motivated by a host of reasons.  The 
desire of both Congress and the President to avoid “increasing the 
size of the federal government” is surely chief among them.  But this 
 
 4 A significant line of contemporary political science research is devoted to political control 
of the bureaucracy and focuses almost exclusively on congressional control.  See the ref-
erences in KENNETH J. MEIER & LAURENCE J. O’TOOLE, JR., BUREAUCRACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC STATE:  A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 22 tbl.2.1 (2006). 
 5 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008). 
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political sleight of hand simultaneously pays tribute to the notion that 
government administered by officials “closer to the people” rein-
forces popular control and democratic accountability.  The necessary 
result is variance across states, and perhaps within them, of the real 
force and effect of federal law—a variance that reflects local political 
preferences and popular political culture. 
Finally, it is an accepted feature of the organization of federal 
administration that political parties will play a role in who administers 
federal law.  This can, of course, reinforce presidential control over 
administration.  But, in House Speaker Tip O’Neill’s famous phrase, 
“all politics is local.”  The mobilization of parties in national elections 
is the mobilization of parties at the state and local level.  And those 
state and local actors must be given a role in the selection of new ad-
ministrations and the setting of the party’s agenda.  Nor is party par-
ticipation in administrative governance merely a replication of either 
decentralized implementation or the influence of congressional of-
fice holders.  The party faithful, who influence appointments to fed-
eral agencies and the shaping of party platforms, may or may not si-
multaneously be the majority party that is in control of state and local 
governmental machinery or of Congress. Although nowhere men-
tioned in the Constitution, and feared by the Constitution’s drafters, 
political parties have become an essential feature of American de-
mocratic governance and a major avenue for outside influence on 
administrative personnel and priorities. 
Competition for control among elected officeholders, direct pub-
lic participation in administrative implementation, decentralized en-
forcement and execution and local partisan participation all contrib-
ute to popular control of administration.  Moreover, these accepted 
features of American governance all, to some degree, undermine 
overhead control of administration by the Chief Executive.  As the 
discussion below illustrates, these are not features of American gov-
ernment that emerged accidentally or without an understanding of 
their potential contributions to some vision of democratic govern-
ance.  But, in antebellum America, these different approaches to 
popular control of administration were often pursued by mechanisms 
that are unfamiliar to contemporary institutional designers or that 
had a different political salience in that earlier period. 
III.  ELECTORAL CONTROL 
I will not here belabor the separation of powers issues that punc-
tuate the 200-plus years of competition between Congresses and Pres-
idents for control over administrative action.  The existing literature 
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is massive, perhaps excessive.  W.F. Willoughby put the point well in 
his 1919 treatise, when he said that the U.S. Constitution “failed ut-
terly to recognize or to make any direct provision for the exercise of 
administrative powers.”  He continued, “[i]n consequence of this 
failure our entire constitutional history has been marked by a strug-
gle between the legislative and executive branches as to the relative 
parts that they should play in the exercise of this power.”6  Those 
comments seem as perspicacious in 2009 as they did in 1919.  But a 
few additional thoughts directly relevant to the current theme of 
popular control seem in order. 
First, the claim that the President represents the people by popu-
lar election was not really a credible claim until the Jacksonian pe-
riod.  It was not until about 1830 that state election laws enfranchised 
most white males and bound presidential electors to cast their ballots, 
for President and Vice President, in accordance with the popular 
vote.7  The Federalists’ normative claim for a strong chief executive 
with substantial control over administration was based on efficiency, 
not democracy.  Indeed, democratic legitimacy was generally thought 
to reside in the legislative branch, particularly the House of Repre-
sentatives, for many years the only directly elected branch of the fed-
eral government.  When the Jeffersonian Republicans took over from 
the Federalists in 1801, Thomas Jefferson described his election as 
working a revolution in the American form of government.8  By this 
he meant that his party was committed to returning authority to the 
legislature, reducing the size of the federal workforce and recogniz-
ing the states as the principal governing authorities for the country.  
Jefferson’s actions were not always true to this vision,9 but it was not 
 
 6 W.F. WILLOUGHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MODERN 
STATES 242 (1919). 
 7 See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:  JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 181–217, 
308–09 (2005), for a discussion of the progression in American presidential elections to-
wards the principle of universal white adult male suffrage. 
 8 Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 212, 214–15 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery 
Bergh eds., 1904) (taking the position that the judiciary should not have the exclusive 
right to interpret the Constitution, and that each of the three branches of government 
should have an equal right to independently decide the meaning of the document). 
 9 Henry Adams summed up the inconsistency of Jefferson’s actions with his “Virginia Re-
publican” principles:  “[T]he embargo and the Louisiana purchase taken together were 
more destructive to the theory and practice of a Virginia republic than any foreign war 
was likely to be.”  2 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING 
THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 273 (Antiquarian Press Ltd. 1962) 
(1890). 
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until Jackson that the President could realistically claim to speak for 
the people. 
Second, in the Early Republic, even more than now, congressional 
statutes named the President as the administrative officer in charge 
of new legislative policies.10  It was recognized that the President 
would delegate this authority to others, and that the statutes them-
selves gave the President a direct role in administration.  Neverthe-
less, both Congress and the courts distinguished between the Presi-
dent’s directive authority under statutes that specifically authorized 
presidential action, and those that empowered other officers to carry 
out administrative duties.11 
This was true even under statutes that were highly presidential in 
form.  For example, the Embargo of 1807–180912 is often character-
ized as “Jefferson’s Embargo,” because the plan was his idea, and the 
implementing statutes13 virtually all named the President as the prin-
cipal administrative officer.  But, not every provision of the legislation 
carried this implication.  One of the Treasury’s early instructions to 
Collectors of Revenue under the embargo statutes informed them 
that the President considered vessels loaded with provisions to be 
suspicious and subject to detention.  Following orders, the Collector 
at Charleston refused to grant clearance to a vessel loaded with rice 
and ostensibly bound for Baltimore.  The Collector had publicly de-
nied that he personally found the vessel suspicious, but explained his 
actions by invoking the presidential instruction. 
Relying on the Collector’s public statements, the owner of the ves-
sel brought a mandamus action in the federal circuit court to have his 
vessel released.  Justice Johnson, a Jefferson appointee sitting as a cir-
cuit judge, ordered the vessel released.14  The relevant statute allowed 
 
 10 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law:  Federalist Foundations, 1787–
1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1299–300 (2006) (describing occasions where Congress pre-
sumed administrative and regulatory responsibilities to be the President’s in regards to 
war or foreign affairs). 
 11 See the discussion in Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006), arguing that the President has authority to administer 
the laws only when the statute specifically grants it, but not when the statute grants the 
authority to another executive officer. 
 12 For classic treatments of the embargo, see generally WALTER WILSON JENNINGS, THE 
AMERICAN EMBARGO 1807–1809 (A.M. Schlesinger ed., 1921), and LOUIS MARTIN SEARS, 
JEFFERSON AND THE EMBARGO (1927). 
 13 For details on the statutory history of the embargo, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nation-
alists:  Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 
YALE L.J. 1636, 1650–55 (2007). 
 14 See Ex parte Gilchrist, 10 F. Cas. 355, 366 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420) (stating that there 
is good reason for the court to exercise its mandamus power and release the vessel). 
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detention when the Collector was of the opinion that the vessel in-
tended to evade the embargo.  According to Justice Johnson, nothing 
in the statute gave the President the authority to direct the Collector 
to hold a vessel contrary to the Collector’s own judgment.  On the 
advice of the Attorney General that circuit courts had no mandamus 
jurisdiction, Jefferson instructed other Collectors to ignore manda-
mus orders from federal circuit courts.  And Congress quickly passed 
an amendment to the embargo statutes confirming the President’s 
authority to direct the seizure of a vessel, but not before the opposi-
tion press excoriated Jefferson as dictatorial and an enemy of the rule 
of law.15  The Gilchrist case, and the political warfare that surrounded 
it, illustrate not only the continuous struggles over presidential au-
thority, but also the contemporary understanding that the directive 
authority of the President with respect to administration was subject 
to control by statute.16 
The default position was surely that the President could direct so 
long as the officer had discretion under the statute and the Presi-
dent’s directions did not go beyond the officer’s authority.17  But, 
Congress could change the default.  Under the embargo statutes, the 
collectors clearly had discretion, but on Judge Johnson’s interpreta-
tion, they had no discretion not to exercise it themselves.  And Presi-
dents may not rewrite the law.18  In short, antebellum statutes often 
reinforced the President’s claim to exercise democratic political con-
 
 15 For a discussion of Gilchrist and the reactions to it, see 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 324–38 (rev. ed. 1926) (noting Jefferson’s decision to 
seize certain vessels, the intense public reaction it caused, and Johnson’s decision to call 
Jefferson’s instructions illegal). 
 16 President Jefferson may have had the better of the argument on the merits as well.  The 
first embargo statute provided that the President had authority to issue “such instructions 
to the officers of the revenue, and of the navy and revenue cutters of the United States, as 
shall appear best adapted for carrying the same [meaning the statute] into full effect.”  
An Act Laying an Embargo on All Ships and Vessels in the Ports and Harbors of the Unit-
ed States, ch. 5, § 1, 2 Stat. 451 (1807) (repealed 1809).  Moreover, while Jefferson’s in-
structions constrained the collectors’ discretion, they did not displace that discretion 
completely.  And, as Jefferson later explained to Governor Pinckney, he acted to ensure 
the consistent and faithful execution of the laws.  See Letter from President Thomas Jef-
ferson to Governor Charles Pinckney (July 18, 1808), in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 8, at 102–04 (discussing Jefferson’s goals of consistency and uni-
formity when deciding the law). 
 17 Indeed, so long as the officer had discretion under the statute, there was no judicial re-
view of his judgment.  On judicial review in the antebellum republic and the limitations 
of the writ of mandamus, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”:  Admin-
istrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1669–84 (2008) and 
authorities therein cited. 
 18 For a classic early case, see Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178 (1804), noting that 
the President gives orders according to instructions and acts of Congress. 
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trol over administration by adding the imprimatur of a popularly 
elected assembly.  But not always. 
Third, and finally, if normative commitments to a particular form 
of popular control of administration are to be judged by how events 
played out on the ground, congressional claims to authentic popular 
control may be superior to those of Presidents, at least in the antebel-
lum period.  Presidents like Washington, Jefferson and Jackson exer-
cised substantial control over administrative matters, both large and 
small.  But, the overall pattern of political action favored what Wood-
row Wilson famously called “congressional government.”19  Although 
Wilson almost certainly over-stated his case, he had this to say about 
the presidency in 1885: 
The business of the president, occasionally great, is usually not much 
above routine.  Most of the time it is mere administration, mere obedience 
of directions from the masters of policy, the Standing Committees.  Ex-
cept in so far as his power of veto constitutes him a part of the legislature, 
the President might, not inconveniently, be a permanent officer; the first 
official of a carefully-graded and impartially regulated civil service system, 
through whose sure series of merit-promotions the youngest clerk might 
rise even to the chief magistracy.20 
Other commentators have been less imaginative, but they often 
echo Wilson’s basic proposition.  Speaking of the period before Jack-
son reasserted presidential power, Wilfred E. Binkley said:  “[B]y 
1825, unless the trend were checked, the presidency bade fair to rep-
resent, in time, not much more than a chairmanship of a group of 
permanent secretaries of the executive departments to which Con-
gress . . . paid more attention than to the President.”21  And, at the 
close of the Jacksonian era, populated by Presidents (Polk perhaps 
excepted) whom no one remembers, Leonard White concluded con-
cerning the appointments process for administrative personnel, “[i]n 
this aspect of the struggle for power, the legislative branch stood rela-
tively a victor in 1861 even though the executive still held high [i.e., 
constitutional] ground.”22 
To be sure, as Calabresi and Yoo point out over and over again in 
their book, Presidents often asserted their claim to executive author-
 
 19 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (The World Publishing Co. 1973) 
(1885). 
 20 Id. at 170. 
 21 WILFRED E. BINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 78–79 (3d rev. ed. 1962) (1947). 
 22 LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS:  A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1829–1861, 
at 124 (1954). 
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ity,23 and, at least after Jackson, they could do so in part on the basis 
of their popular mandates.  My point is merely that there was a strong 
and competing vision of political control based in electoral politics—
assembly government.  From the 1820s forward, Congress increas-
ingly organized itself in specialized committees in order, not just to 
legislate, but to oversee administration.  Presidential authority had a 
number of good years, but in most years throughout the antebellum 
period, the idea of “political control of administration” would have 
been interpreted to refer to the relationship between administrators 
and Congress. 
IV.  POPULAR INVOLVEMENT IN ADMINISTRATION 
The Ambiguity of Office.  Today the idea of popular control of bu-
reaucratic elites tends to be understood as a desire to infuse bureau-
cratic processes—populated by professionalized and mission-oriented 
career civil servants—with the preferences and normative commit-
ments of ordinary citizens.  While we recognize that many agencies 
and departments cannot operate effectively without the specialized 
knowledge of biologists, engineers, economists, and so on, and while 
we also expect these personnel to be dedicated to their agency’s core 
mission, we do not believe that protecting the environment, regulat-
ing consumer fraud, or building highways, exhausts our vision of 
good public policy or a good life.  The involvement of ordinary citi-
zens in administration through participation in agency processes, 
serving on advisory committees and the like, is often designed to 
temper agency tunnel vision.  By a “bureaucratic elite” we tend to 
mean a group of professionals with specialized knowledge who are 
dedicated to a particular task or mission. 
These modern ideas of bureaucratic elitism are almost wholly in-
appropriate to the conditions of American governance in the Ante-
bellum period.  President Washington famously based appointments 
of officers on what he called “fitness of character,” by which he meant 
people who had the respect of their fellows and would therefore help 
to engender respect for the new national government.24  Virtually all 
field personnel were chosen from the locality in which they would 
 
 23 Often, but surely not always.  President Tyler, for example, proposed to make the Treas-
ury a truly independent agency, thus, in his words establishing “a complete separa-
tion . . . between the sword and the purse.”  John Tyler, Inaugural Address (Apr. 9, 1841), 
in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1889–90 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1897). 
 24 LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS:  A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 258–59 
(1948). 
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serve.  In a significant sense the officers’ authority did not come from 
the office.  The government’s authority came from its association with 
the private status of the office holder.  Popular control, that is, con-
trol of official action by people who were respected in their commu-
nities, was in this sense built into the idea of office itself. 
Moreover, most officials outside of the capital, which contained 
relatively few, were part-time employees, compensated by fees and 
commissions.  These officials were not the full-time salaried career 
civil servants of modern imagination, but hybrid “officers” who com-
bined federal authority, independent political standing and private 
entrepreneurship.  It was quite unclear whether the federal official 
should be viewed as an officer who also had a private occupation, or 
as a private citizen who carried out some aspects of the public service.  
Customs and excise tax collectors, federal marshals, and deputy 
postmasters were spread across the country in areas of both large and 
minimal population and commerce.  In many smaller communities 
there simply was not enough government work to justify full-time sa-
laried employees.  The local printer or general store owner was pri-
marily that, and only served incidentally as the local deputy postmas-
ter.25 
This confusion of public and private roles could obviously lead to 
abusive practices, particularly when “good character” took on politi-
cal overtones.  President Washington also demanded that appointees 
be well-disposed toward the government.  In the context of the times, 
this also meant that the appointee was a good Federalist.  In the early 
years of the Republic, political disagreement was often interpreted as 
disagreement over fundamental principles.  Hence, the local printer-
postmaster was often also the publisher of a federalist newspaper or 
broadsheet.  Complaints were rife that these printer-postmasters cir-
culated Federalist newspapers without paying postage and delayed or 
misplaced Republican publications posted for delivery through the 
mails.26 
Similarly, while paying on a piece rate or commission tended to 
promote energy in office, it also had its downside.  Many believed 
that pecuniary rewards for unpleasant jobs like tax collection were es-
sential.  Tench Coxe, the U.S. Commissioner of Revenue, wrote to 
 
 25 See generally Karen Orren, The Work of Government:  Recovering the Discourse of Office in Mar-
bury v. Madison, 8 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 60 (1994) (describing the notion of office in the 
Early Republic as a holdover from an earlier period in which offices were treated as a spe-
cies of property). 
 26 For a study emphasizing the excesses of these and other Federalist office holders, see 
CARL E. PRINCE, THE FEDERALISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE (1977). 
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Alexander Hamilton that “it was more easy to excite [the tax collec-
tors’] attention and Vigilance and to animate their exertions by an 
addition to their Commissions . . . than to their salaries.”27  But, it was 
not easy to get the incentives right.  The prospect of large gains from 
finding that importers had fraudulently declared the contents or val-
ue of a vessel’s goods, tempted collectors and other revenue officers 
to turn technical violations into allegations of fraud—allegations that 
could force large settlements from ship owners who could not afford 
to risk either delay in selling their goods or losing their vessels and 
cargoes.28 
Central offices at the capital attempted to regulate the behavior of 
widely-dispersed federal officials.  Alexander Hamilton, for example, 
issued scores of Treasury circulars and instructions to field person-
nel,29 and other department heads followed similar practices.  More-
over, Congress reinforced supervisory authority in numerous statutes 
specifying that lower level officials were subject to the superintending 
instruction of higher level administrators.30  But, these statutory provi-
sions and administrative attempts at control went somewhat against 
the grain of conventional understandings of an officer’s position.  Of-
fices were never heritable property as they had sometimes been in 
England, but the degree to which a part-time official paid by fees and 
commissions and engaged in other businesses was subject to stringent 
overhead supervisory control was a vexed question.  As a legal matter 
it was often difficult to determine whether a person was an “officer” 
or a “contractor.”31 
When Thomas Jefferson took office in 1801, the federal civilian 
establishment consisted of roughly 3,000 officers, only 150 of whom 
 
 27 Letter from Tench Coxe, U.S. Comm’r of Revenue to Alexander Hamilton, Sec’y of the 
Treasury (July 25, 1792), in 12 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 85, 88 (Harold C. 
Syrett ed., 1967). 
 28 Nicholas Parrillo, The Rise of Non-Profit Government in America:  The Case of Federal 
Customs Collection 53 (Dec. 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 29 A small sample of Hamilton’s Treasury circulars is included in 3 THE WORKS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 537–70 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York, John F. Trow 1850).  
Other examples appear in LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE CUSTOMS SERVICE:  ITS 
HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 8 (1924); 5 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 49 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904); and 6 id. at 340. 
 30 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 232, 234 (stating that the Postmaster Gen-
eral will be in charge of those under his employ); An Act to Establish the Treasury De-
partment, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 65–66 (1789) (discussing the duties of the Secretary of 
the Treasury); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 48, § 4, 1 Stat. 376, 378, (repealed 1802) (noting 
that certain duties are under the control of the department of the treasury). 
 31 See, for example, Justice Marshall’s opinion in United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 
1213 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747) (noting that there is some ambiguity as to who, ac-
cording to law, is counted as an officer). 
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were located in the capital.  These latter officials were easily super-
vised, but field personnel had to be managed by correspondence, re-
ports, and inspections.  Given the difficulties of communication and 
transportation, even Herculean efforts on the part of central office 
personnel were of uncertain affect.  Commenting on the early system 
of annual audits in the General Land Office, for example, Matthew 
Crenson reported: 
The department would appoint some respected citizen who lived in the 
vicinity of a district land office to take a day off from his private labors 
and look in on the affairs of the register and receiver [of public lands].  
Frequently, the examiner was a friend and political ally of both officers, 
and it was not uncommon for him to know nothing at all about the 
proper manner in which to conduct the business of a land office.  The 
report which he sent to Washington was, in most cases, completely use-
less.32 
In this case, popular control was compounded.  To oversee officers, 
who were themselves ambiguously attached to the government, the 
Department used other private citizens. 
Ordinary citizens were enlisted to enforce the obligations of fed-
eral officers in other ways as well.  Most federal officials were required 
to take an oath of office and to provide a bond for faithful service.33  
Nonfeasance or malfeasance could result in the forfeiture of the 
bond and also in criminal penalties.34  Superior officers were author-
ized to pursue collections of bond forfeitures or fines by lawsuit.35  
This injected yet another popular element into the control of ad-
ministration—local juries—a question to which we will shortly return.  
In addition, many of these statutes provided a “qui tam” action, allow-
ing a private party to bring suit against an officer and, if successful, to 
retain one-half the proceeds of the fine or forfeiture.36 
This is not to say that the idea of office was static during the Ante-
bellum period.  But, in many ways, changes tended to reemphasize 
popular control by giving it another form.  As will be discussed in 
more detail below, Andrew Jackson’s program of democratizing of-
 
 32 MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE:  BEGINNINGS OF BUREAUCRACY IN 
JACKSONIAN AMERICA 88 (1975). 
 33 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 18, 1796, ch. 13, § 2, 1 Stat. 452, 452–53 (requiring agents appointed 
to trading houses with American Indian tribes to take an oath to faithfully execute the 
trust committed to him); see also Mashaw, supra note 10, at 1317. 
 34 See Mashaw, supra note 10, at 1316–17 (discussing the range of penalties and forfeitures 
included in early statutes). 
 35 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 18, 1796, ch.13, § 7, 1 Stat. at 453 (requiring agents to forfeit a sum 
for offence in a court action prosecuted by a supervisor of Indian affairs). 
 36 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 3 Stat. 266; Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 
101, 102 (requiring that one half of a forfeiture be given to the informant). 
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fices by making them available to anyone with appropriate party back-
ing was an attack on “bureaucratic elites.”  But elitism here meant 
high social standing, or the sense of privilege that came from long 
service in a particular office.  The Jacksonian “spoils system” was a re-
invention of popular control of administration in opposition to office 
holding as a privilege of higher status individuals or as a quasi-
property right.  And while this democratic or popular innovation de-
generated into a corrupt system that supported party organizations, it 
did not necessarily support presidential control of administration.  In 
order for the new system to work as a way of mobilizing local political 
actors in national elections, those local actors, and the people in 
Congress who represented them, had to be given substantial control 
over office holding.37 
The Use of Laymen in Administrative Decision Making and Enforcement.  
In a number of ways, early arrangements for federal administration of 
the law insinuated laypersons directly into public administration.  For 
example, in one of its first revenue measures,38 Congress required 
that customs officials use laymen to assist in resolving any disputes 
about valuation.  Under the statute, a ship’s papers and invoices were 
required to be taken as prima facie evidence of what the vessel con-
tained and of the value of the goods.39  If officials believed that some 
goods were not disclosed in the invoices, or that the invoices misrep-
resented the value of the cargo, they could levy additional duties, but 
only with the approval of two reputable merchants who would be 
asked to determine the value of the goods and their conformity to 
the ship’s invoices.40 
Similarly, ships clearing a port were required to declare their next 
destination and were allowed to unload only at that port.  Collection 
officers could waive this requirement but only with the agreement of 
the wardens of the local port (presumably state or local officials) or, 
if there were no wardens, two reputable citizens “acquainted with 
matters of that kind.”41  Should goods not be accompanied by in-
voices or should they be damaged in transit, they were once again to 
be valued by two merchants.42  And, as in the case of suspected fraud 
 
 37 See generally CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE (Russell & Russell 
Inc. 1963) (1904) (discussing the history of civil service and patronage in government). 
 38 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790). 
 39 Id. § 13. 
 40 Id. § 22. 
 41 Id. § 12. 
 42 Id. §§ 16, 22. 
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in the invoices, one merchant was appointed by the collector and the 
other by the owner or consignee of the goods in dispute.43 
The involvement of merchants in the activities of custom houses 
was much more extensive than these statutory provisions reveal.  Cus-
toms officials were chosen from the merchant class and constantly ac-
commodated federal policy to the necessities of trade.44  As Gautham 
Rao has recently demonstrated, it is hardly too much to say that in 
the early years of the Republic, the major customs houses were run by 
the local merchants.45 
A similar involvement of both regulatory beneficiaries and neutral 
parties can be found in the national government’s first foray into 
health and safety regulation.46  That statute, in addition to requiring 
specific provisions and medicines aboard sailing vessels,47 required 
that the master keep the ship in port if the mate or first officer and a 
majority of the crew felt the ship was unseaworthy.48  The master 
could petition a district judge, or if unavailable, a justice of the peace, 
for an order to put to sea.  And, while the judicial officer had final 
authority to make a decision, he was required to appoint three skillful 
mariners in the town to examine the vessel and to make a report on 
its condition.49 
Qui tam actions have already been mentioned, and they were at-
tached to a large number of federal statutes, not only to police the ac-
tivities of federal officers, but also to provide additional enforcement 
resources beyond those available through the U.S. Attorneys in each 
state.  Moreover, to avoid the expense of maintaining a substantial 
standing Navy, the United States relied heavily on the issuance of Let-
ters of Marques to private vessels, which authorized them to seize en-
emy vessels and their cargos as prizes. 
The nation’s first attempt at regulating steamboat safety also em-
ployed private inspectors as the primary mechanism of regulation.50  
Section 6 of that Act required each owner or master of a steamboat to 
obtain a yearly inspection of the vessel and a half-yearly inspection of 
the boilers.  The procedure was for the master or owner to petition a 
 
 43 Id. § 16. 
 44 Gautham Rao, The Creation of the American State:  Customhouses, Law, and Commerce 
in the Age of Revolution 84–85 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Chicago) (on file with author). 
 45 Id. at 4–7. 
 46 Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131. 
 47 Id. §§ 8, 9. 
 48 Id. § 3. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, § 3, 5 Stat. 304. 
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federal district judge to appoint one or more persons competent to 
make an inspection.51  If the inspector found the vessel seaworthy and 
its boiler safe, a permit would be issued for the carriage of passen-
gers.52  Although inspectors were required to swear on oath to faith-
fully carry out their duties, they were paid by the owner or master of 
the vessel—five dollars for the inspection of the boat and five dollars 
for certification that the boilers were safe.53  Beyond the requirement 
that the inspector be “competent,” judges could apparently appoint 
anyone as a steamboat inspector.54 
A number of these techniques for inserting lay decision making 
into federal administration and law enforcement turned out to be in-
effective or corruptible.  Privateers tended to be useless against regu-
lar navies, tended not to make nice distinctions between friend and 
foe, and sometimes were hard to restrain once peace was restored.55  
Informer suits could be used for personal harassment, or to corrupt 
public officers through collusion between the informant and the en-
forcer,56 and the use of judicially appointed lay steamboat inspectors 
turned out to have little or no impact on the loss of life from explod-
ing boilers on steamships.57  Nevertheless, in the antebellum period it 
seems clear that Congress was willing to use lay administration and 
enforcement of federal law in extremely important areas of govern-
ment policy.  Valuation was the most contested issue in customs ad-
ministration, and customs duties provided virtually the whole of fed-
eral revenues.  Steamboat safety was one of the hottest topics of 
public concern from the 1820s until a more reliable system of regula-
tion was developed in the years immediately preceding the Civil 
War.58  Qui tam actions were ubiquitous in federal law, and privateers 
 
 51 Id. § 3. 
 52 Id. §§ 4–6. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. § 3. 
 55 On the system of prizes and its abolition, see RICHARD HILL, THE PRIZES OF WAR:  THE 
NAVAL PRIZE SYSTEM IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS, 1793–1815 (1998); CHRISTOPHER MCKEE, 
A GENTLEMANLY AND HONORABLE PROFESSION:  THE CREATION OF THE U.S. NAVAL 
OFFICER CORPS, 1794–1815 (1991); DONALD A. PETRIE, THE PRIZE GAME:  LAWFUL 
LOOTING ON THE HIGH SEAS IN THE DAYS OF FIGHTING SAIL (1999); and FRANCIS R. STARK, 
THE ABOLITION OF PRIVATEERING AND THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 221 (1897). 
 56 See Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 89, 97 (discussing 
the forms of abuse of qui tam by informants in England and the United States). 
 57 See EDMUND BURKE, COMM’R OF PATENTS, REPORT OF THE COMM’R OF PATENTS TO THE 
SENATE OF THE U.S. ON THE SUBJECT OF STEAM BOILER EXPLOSIONS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 30-
18, at 178 (1848). 
 58 See Mashaw, supra note 17, at 1628–66 (discussing the development of steamboat regula-
tion at a national level in the United States). 
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provided by far the greatest source of naval power for the United 
States in the War of 1812. 
The Lay Jury and Federal Administration.  Federal law not only in-
sinuated private parties into the administration and enforcement of 
federal law, the lay jury provided an enormous constraint on, and 
sometimes a disabling obstacle to, official enforcement of the law. 
Much of the secondary literature on judicial review of administra-
tive action in the nineteenth century describes that review as quite 
limited and, where present, quite deferential.59  This is certainly true 
if one focuses on writ review, primarily mandamus actions.60  But 
common law actions were widely available and could provide substan-
tial relief with respect to many federal administrative activities.61  Sei-
zure of property by revenue officers could be tested by trover, deti-
nue, assumpsit, and other common law actions.  Official immunity 
was non-existent.  Similar actions were available against postal offi-
cials who lost or damaged property consigned to the mail.  The pro-
priety of official action with respect to land patents and invention pa-
tents could be tested collaterally by various forms of property action 
or in suits for patent infringement.62 
Moreover, common law actions involved jury trial, which was 
viewed as a popular control over the potential abuses of federal offi-
cials.  The need for a jury trial to protect against official abuse was 
sometimes portrayed in incendiary terms. 
Suppose, therefore, that the military officers of Congress, by a wanton 
abuse of power, imprison the free citizens of the United States of Amer-
ica; suppose . . . that a constable, having a warrant to search for stolen 
goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a woman and 
searched under her shift—suppose, I say, that they commit similar or 
greater indignities, in such cases a trial by jury would be our safest re-
source, heavy damage would at once punish the offender and deter oth-
ers from committing the same; but what satisfaction can we expect from a 
lordly court of justice, always ready to protect the officers of government 
 
 59 See, e.g., Frederic P. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEO. 
L.J. 287, 296 (1948) (referring to the slight power of writs of mandamus and of equitable 
injunctions in the face of the Supreme Court’s doctrine of non-reviewability of adminis-
trative discretion); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1983) (referring to the increased expressions of judicial deference dur-
ing the nineteenth century, already a time of limited judicial control of administrative 
law); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power:  From Murray’s Lessee 
Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 801–04 (1986) (explaining the deferential 
standard of review in this area where Congress had intended great agency discretion). 
 60 Supported by Lee, supra note 59, at 296. 
 61 For a review and critique of the limited review position, see Ann Woolhandler, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (1991). 
 62 Woolhandler, id., provides a general description of these actions. 
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against the weak and helpless citizens, and who will perhaps sit at the dis-
tance of many hundred miles from the place where the outrage was 
committed?  What refuge shall we then have to shelter us from the iron 
hand of arbitrary power?63 
This complaint, as its language might suggest, was similar to com-
plaints made in virtually every state concerning the failure of Article 
III to provide for jury trials in federal courts and civil cases.64 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 responded to some considerable degree 
to the critics’ fears.  Common law actions were preserved by the re-
quirement that the laws of the several states be regarded as “rules of 
decision”65 in both the district and circuit courts of the United States.  
And, except in equity and admiralty actions, those cases would be 
tried before a jury, chosen from the locality and assembled according 
to local practice.66  Jury decisions were protected from reversal by 
providing only for review by writ of error, not by appeal.67  In addi-
tion, large classes of cases involving federal officials could be tried in 
state courts of general federal question jurisdiction was provided only 
in the Supreme Court in cases appealed from state supreme courts.68 
Popular control of federal officialdom through jury trial in civil 
cases was not a trivial matter.  From the very earliest years of the Re-
public, federal officers found themselves mired in litigation before 
local juries sympathetic to plaintiffs, and with only modest hope of 
rescue by appeal or reimbursement from a special congressional ap-
propriation.69  Leonard White recounts the travails of David Gelston, 
 
 63 Letter to the Editor from “A Democratic Federalist,” PA. PACKET, Oct. 23, 1787, reprinted 
in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION:  1787–1788 at 154 (John Bach McMas-
ter & Frederick D. Stone eds., Lancaster, The Historical Society of Pennsylvania 1888). 
 64 See DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 10–19 (1971) (chronicling the 
issue of jury trials throughout the states during the constitutional ratification process). 
 65 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (establishing that the laws of the states 
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law where the Constitution, 
treaties, or statutes of the United States do not otherwise require or provide). 
 66 Id. § 29 (establishing that trial of cases punishable with death shall be had in the county 
where the offence was committed, that jurors shall be designated by lot, that writs of ve-
nire facias shall issue from the clerk’s office, and that when there is a defect of jurors, ju-
rymen shall be returned de talibus circumstantibus in order to complete the panel). 
 67 Id. § 25 (establishing review writ of error as the only ground for reversal). 
 68 Id. § 25.  Numerous federal statutes also confirmed the jurisdiction of state and local 
courts.  See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 28, 1 Stat. 733, 740–41 (authorizing actions 
for violation of the postal laws to be brought in any state or territorial court or before jus-
tices of the peace). 
 69 See Mashaw, supra note 10, at 1325–29 (describing the personal legal entanglements de-
rived from the position of federal officer during the Federalist period, citing the stories of 
William Bingham and Jeremiah Olney). 
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who became collector for the Port of New York in 1802.70  During his 
eighteen years of service, Gelston obtained $37,000 as his share of the 
value of seized property, but lost $107,000 in only one of the lawsuits 
brought against him.  Gelston, like many federal officers, sought re-
lief from Congress, but often found the claims committees unsympa-
thetic.  And, even when relief was provided, it could be long delayed.  
Gelston left office in 1820.  His accounts were finally settled in 1842—
by a payment to his estate. 
Jury interposition was a particular problem in the enforcement of 
the embargo.  While he hoped that naval officers would do their du-
ty, Albert Gallatin wrote to Thomas Jefferson concerning enforce-
ment by collectors of revenue:  “[W]e cannot expect that the collec-
tors generally will risk all they are worth in doubtful cases.”71  
Congress was occasionally willing to provide some protection for fed-
eral officials,72 but Congress did not lightly give up the right to jury 
trial.  During the enforcement of the embargo legislation, Gallatin 
proposed a statute that would put all embargo-related litigation in 
federal court and provide collectors with immunity from a suit for 
damages if they obtained Treasury certification of the reasonableness 
of their actions.  His proposals failed to pass. 
The Taney Court later attempted to create, judicially, some pro-
tection for federal officials, but its efforts were largely unavailing.  Af-
ter Postmaster General Amos Kendall was driven to the door of the 
poorhouse by judgments that he could not pay, the Supreme Court 
discovered immunity for high public officials, like Kendall, in the 
English common law.73  But the Taney Court’s broader attempt to in-
 
 70 See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS:  A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1801–
1829, at 153–56 (1951) (referring to the cases involving damages won against Gelston by 
ship owners during his tenure, despite the lack of any suggestion of misappropriation or 
misfeasance on his part). 
 71 1 WARREN, supra note 15, at 338 (quoting Gallatin’s letter to Jefferson). 
 72 Some early statutes allowed a court to absolve a federal official of damages from seizing a 
taxpayer’s ship or goods by finding that the official had reasonable cause, even if a jury 
had declared the seizure illegal.  See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 89, 1 Stat. 627 (detailing 
provisions to protect the collector from personal liability in an act to regulate the collec-
tion of duties on imports and tonnage); Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 36, 1 Stat. 29, 47–48 
(repealed 1790). 
 73 Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 97–98 (1845) (“[A] public officer is not liable to 
an action if he falls into error in a case where the act to be done is not merely a ministe-
rial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; 
even although an individual may suffer by his mistake.”); 2 FRANK J. GOODNOW, 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS 
NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY 165–66 
(1893) (comparing British ministerial privilege with the holding in Kendall). 
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terpret congressional legislation as implicitly establishing immunity74 
was firmly rejected by subsequent legislation reaffirming the right to 
trial by jury “according to the due course of law.”75 
Where popular sentiment opposed federal policy, the require-
ment of jury trial in criminal prosecutions or in civil forfeiture actions 
could virtually nullify federal administration.  Massachusetts was a 
hotbed of opposition to the Embargo of 1807–1809.  Describing ef-
forts to enforce the embargo in Massachusetts, John Quincy Adams 
wrote to W.B. Giles:  “[T]here may be impediments to execution [of 
the laws] besides those known to the Constitution.”76  And, “[t]he dis-
trict court after sitting seven or eight weeks, and trying upwards of 
forty cases, has at length adjourned.  Not one instance has occurred 
of a conviction by jury . . . .”77  Much later, Douglas Lamar Jones inves-
tigated the role of judge and jury in enforcing the embargo in Massa-
chusetts by looking at the proceedings before District Judge Davis.  In 
cases tried before Judge Davis alone, convictions predominated, ei-
ther by court judgment or by a no contest plea.  During the same pe-
riod in the same court, federal juries convicted twelve defendants 
while acquitting fifty-three.78 
Although the willingness of juries to convict remains a significant 
consideration in the enforcement of federal and state law today, 
popular control of administration through damage actions against of-
ficials plays a much smaller role in popular control of administration 
in the twenty-first century than it did in the nineteenth.  Control of 
officialdom by jury verdict was seen as an important safeguard of in-
dividual liberty, even though it clearly interfered with supervisory 
control of upper-level federal officials.  Perhaps the only way that the 
fear of jury verdicts promoted centralized control of administration 
 
 74 Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 252 (1845) (holding that the Act of March 3, 1839 
was a bar to an action of assumpsit lying against collectors of the customs for unascer-
tained duties or for duties paid under protest). 
 75 Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727 (specifically contradicting the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Cary, by directing that “nothing contained in the second section of the act en-
titled ‘An act making appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenses of Government 
for the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine,’ [Act of March 3, 1839] . . . be 
construed to take away or impair, the right of any person or persons who have paid or 
shall hereafter pay money, as and for duties, under protest, to any collector of the cus-
toms . . . and to have a right to a trial by jury . . . according to the due course of law”). 
 76 Letter from John Quincy Adams to William Branch Giles (Dec. 26, 1808), in 3 WRITINGS 
OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 1801–1810, at 281, 283–84 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 
The MacMillan Company 1914). 
 77 Id. at 287. 
 78 Douglas Lamar Jones, “The Caprice of Juries”:  The Enforcement of the Jeffersonian Embargo in 
Massachusetts, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307, 326 n.68 (1980) (indicating that Judge Davis’s 
conviction rate was much higher than that of federal juries). 
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was the incentive that it provided to federal officers to seek advice 
from superiors before acting.  Although that advice would not protect 
the officer in a damage action if a jury determined his actions to be 
illegal, it was useful when the officer sought reimbursement, however 
belatedly it might arrive, from Congress. 
V.  DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION 
As mentioned previously, modern federal practice includes sub-
stantial utilization of state and local personnel in “cooperative feder-
alism” schemes that leave substantial discretion in state and local au-
thorities concerning both policies and enforcement priorities.  This 
both reduces the size of the federal “bureaucratic elite” and promotes 
decision making in sites of governance that are closer to the people.  
Whether these state and local actors are actually more representative 
of the local population may be disputed, but that such arrangements 
limit top-down control by federal officials is hardly controversial. 
Patterns of activity in antebellum America were somewhat differ-
ent, but arguably were equally respectful, if not more, of decentral-
ized control.  The most obvious form of respect was to leave much of 
the protection of citizens’ health and welfare to state action.  In ante-
bellum America, the federal government regulated some health and 
safety matters, seamen’s contracts and steam ships being the major 
and exceptional examples, but this left huge amounts of state and lo-
cal regulation to be established and implemented as states and locali-
ties saw fit.79  Localism in the implementation of federal law was also 
respected by the prohibition in the 1789 Judiciary Act against arrest 
or trial of anyone “in any other district than that whereof he is an in-
habitant.”80 
Other statutes went somewhat further.  Although titled “An Act to 
Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization,” the first Naturalization 
Act, while providing that any person who resided in the United States 
for two years could become a citizen, specified that the application 
for citizenship should be to any common law court of record in the 
state where he had resided for at least one year.  These state courts 
 
 79 See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE:  LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (discussing the extensiveness of state and local regulation in 
the nineteenth century). 
 80 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). 
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were left on their own to determine whether the applicant was of 
“good character.”81 
In a couple of instances, Congress reversed the modern scheme of 
state implementation of federal law by providing for federal imple-
mentation of state requirements.  Federal revenue officers were har-
nessed to the enforcement of state quarantine regulation82 and to the 
widespread state practice of regulating the quality of exports.83  Un-
der the latter statute, federal officials were not only enforcing state 
law, they were enforcing the requirement of inspection by state ad-
ministrative officials. 
Indeed, it is hard to overstate the degree to which retaining law-
making and implementation at the state level was equated in antebel-
lum America with the maintenance of government by the people.  
The sordid undertones of slavery protection infected many claims for 
the special democratic legitimacy of “states rights,” but there is little 
reason to doubt that Jeffersonian Republicans and Jacksonian De-
mocrats were sincere in the belief that popular control of govern-
ment meant leaving much of it in the hands of the states. 
VI.  POPULAR CONTROL THROUGH PARTY ORGANIZATION 
One might think of the injection of party ideology into the selec-
tion and retention of administrative officials as part and parcel of un-
itary control by the President.  Presidents are, at least in formal terms, 
the leaders of their parties, and they are more ideologically aligned 
with their party electorate than with the electorate as a whole.  Selec-
tion on the basis of party might therefore be a form of ex ante control 
of administrative action from the top.  Emphasizing ideological 
alignment and party loyalty economizes on the necessity of overhead 
monitoring and direction.  On this view, control of administration 
through party organization is little more than the implementation of 
electoral victories through mechanisms that strengthen the unitary 
executive. 
There is much to be said for this view.  But there are other aspects 
of party participation in the appointments and agenda-setting proc-
 
 81 Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 2 Stat. 103, 103 (repealed 1795).  For a description of 
state practice see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:  IMMIGRANTS, 
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996). 
 82 Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474 (repealed 1799) (authorizing the President of the 
United States to direct federal officers to aid in the execution of state quarantine and 
health laws). 
 83 Act of Apr. 2, 1790, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 106 (repealed 1799) (directing federal revenue officers 
to aid in the enforcement of state export inspection laws). 
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esses of the Executive Branch that move control away from the Presi-
dent; that, indeed, emphasize both congressional control and local 
popular control. 
We have already discussed the somewhat ambiguous position of 
federal officials in the early years of the Republic.  Both Federalists 
and Jeffersonian Republicans selected their office-holders largely on 
the basis of character or standing in the community.  Jefferson en-
gaged in partisan removals to establish parity between Federalists and 
Republicans after his election, but the general practice prior to An-
drew Jackson’s election was to retain appointees unless demonstrably 
corrupt or incompetent.  This produced something like a “career ser-
vice” of experienced administrators, which may have contributed to 
the efficiency of administrative operations.  It certainly contributed to 
the stability and relative autonomy of office-holders.  Jackson was cor-
rect that office was morphing into a form of property where sons 
sometimes followed their fathers into the same federal positions.84 
Jackson attacked this system in his famous first annual message to 
Congress: 
  There are, perhaps, few men who can for any great length of time en-
joy office and power without being more or less under the influence of 
feelings unfavorable to the faithful discharge of their public du-
ties. . . . Office is considered as a species of property, and government ra-
ther as a means of promoting individual interests than as an instrument 
created solely for the service of the people. . . . 
In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the 
people no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than 
another.85 
In short, rotation in office was a means by which democracy could be 
served and the aristocracy of office defeated. 
Although Jackson’s democratic ideals degenerated into a spoils 
system that was later viewed as the epitome of corrupt government, 
many others had voiced similar, democratic rationales for a system of 
rotation, or for term limits.  Carl Russell Fish’s classic study shows that 
public-spirited rationales for rotation can be traced back to Dutch, 
English, colonial, and state practices.86  Prominent among them are 
 
 84 See FISH, supra note 37, at 75–78 (“[S]ons were often appointed to succeed fathers . . . .”); 
WHITE, supra note 22, at 300–01 (“Forty years of substantially steady practice prior to 1829 
had established a tradition of permanence and stability in the public service of the federal 
government.”). 
 85 Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1829), in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 23, at 1005, 1011–12 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1897). 
 86 See FISH, supra note 37, at 52–104 (examining the origins and significance of the rotation 
system). 
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avoiding autocracy and corruption, eliminating any sense of property 
in office, educating citizens in the responsibilities of governance, 
weakening executive power (where appointments required legislative 
approval), assuring the loyalty of officials to the elected government, 
and avoiding the need to assign cause to rid the government of inef-
fective personnel. 
Fish also gives an explanation of the spoils system that emphasizes 
its relationship to popular control of the government.  In his analysis, 
for the mass of people to influence ordinary government operations, 
they must be organized.  Having a party that emerges episodically at 
election time is not enough.  In order to shape the agenda of gov-
ernment and to bring out the vote in national elections, the party 
must be continuously active at the state and local level.  This con-
tinuous effort requires resources; and, if influence is not to be limited 
to the rich and well-born, the party must supply the resources.  Poli-
tics must pay.  And in Jacksonian America the only way that that 
could be accomplished was for the civil service to provide the payroll 
for party workers. 
More recent studies echo Fish’s account.  Gerald Leonard, for ex-
ample, details the transition from “antiparty” constitutional thought 
to the idea of party in America as the bulwark of popular sover-
eignty.87  Moreover, the shrewd political operative, Martin Van Buren, 
who did much to get Jackson elected and who followed him into the 
White House, defended the spoils system in essentially the same 
terms.  For Van Buren, who was perhaps the first theoretician of party 
politics, the spoils system was required in order for there to be either 
serious electoral competition or widespread participation by the po-
pulace in influencing the policies of the government.88 
Party control of administration is “popular” in a double sense.  
First, parties are porous.  Virtually anyone who is willing to devote ef-
fort and/or resources to party work can become involved and have 
influence.  Second, unless the party is effective in getting candidates 
elected by popular vote, it will disappear, or be required to change its 
positions on matters of political moment.  And, in turn, elected rep-
resentatives are both beholden to the party and in a position to pro-
vide it with benefits that may be essential to its continued success.  As 
a consequence, the patronage controlled by the party must also be in 
the control of both local and national elected officials.  While pa-
 
 87 See GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS:  FEDERALISM, POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS (2002). 
 88 See MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND COURSE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1967) (1867). 
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tronage is nominally in the control of the appointing official, the 
President or the department head, it may be, and often is, in the sub-
stantive control of both congressmen and local elected officials. 
To some degree, the Jacksonian spoils system, with its tendency to 
parcel out power to local party organizations and elected officials, 
created a reaction that began in Jackson’s own administration.  Offi-
cials at the center sought to create systems of audit, oversight, and in-
spection that would allow them to control this newly democratized 
group of federal administrative officials.89  But, these efforts were only 
modestly successful.90  A unitary executive in principle could not be 
unitary in fact if competition for the loyalty of administrators based 
on local, party, and congressional connections effectively limited 
overhead control.  This was not merely a limitation based on failures 
of implementation in a system committed to top down control.  Lo-
cal, party, and congressional control were also normatively attractive 
visions of popular control of administration. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing, it seems fair to conclude that popular control 
of bureaucratic elites has a number of meanings and may be pursued 
through multiple techniques.  It may be appropriate to characterize 
these techniques as carrying out two more general approaches to 
popular government.  In one, government is popular because those 
who have authority are under the control of political actors who are 
popularly elected.  This is true of both presidential and congressional 
control of administration and also of decentralized administration 
through state and local officials.  In this version of popular control, 
bureaucrats’ democratic pedigree comes from their connection to 
the representatives of the people, whether at the national or at the 
state and local level. 
The second general approach is to insinuate “the people” into 
administration itself.  One means for pursuing this vision is to blur 
the distinction between laymen and officials.  This was a particularly 
prevalent form of popular control in antebellum America, either be-
cause officials were only tentatively or ambiguously attached to the 
 
 89 See CRENSON, supra note 32 for a general discussion. 
 90 See WHITE, supra note 22, at 251–69, 376–93 (discussing the management of the post of-
fice and the policy of compensation for government officers); see also MALCOLM J. 
ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS:  THE SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS, 1789–1837, at 200–70 (1968) (examining the administration of 
the Land Office Business from 1830–1837). 
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national government, or because official station was mediated 
through participation in a non-governmental organization—the po-
litical party.  In another form, citizens were the administrators, but 
were called upon on an ad hoc basis to resolve valuation disputes, to 
inspect sailing vessels and steamboats, or to determine the liability of 
both officials and private parties by jury verdict.  In other instances, 
these lay personnel became the enforcement arm of the government 
itself, either as qui tam relators or as privateers. 
These visions of popular control not only compete with unitary 
presidential control by weakening the capacity of central officials un-
der presidential direction to manage implementation effectively, but 
also compete normatively as independently attractive means for limit-
ing bureaucratic excesses, guiding bureaucratic judgment, and en-
forcing bureaucratic loyalty.  I cannot here begin to evaluate the rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses of these alternative and competing 
notions of popular control of bureaucracy.  Indeed, such a task may 
be beyond the scope of many books, not just one short paper.  The 
degree to which one finds one or another vision of popular control 
attractive depends upon contingent factors that shift both with sub-
ject-matter context and across time periods.  It could hardly be oth-
erwise.  Every vision of popular control, whether it is representative 
democracy through established national institutions, decentralized 
control through local and state representatives, or the insinuation of 
lay energy and judgment into the processes of bureaucratic admini-
stration, has both strengths and well-known defects.  Strong control 
by the Chief Executive can promote democratic accountability; it can 
also degenerate into forms of authoritarian excess.  The participation 
of regulated parties or beneficiaries in the administration of federal 
law can provide a needed corrective to bureaucratic tunnel vision; it 
can also degenerate into the seizure of public power by private inter-
ests.  Local control of administration can harmonize national policy 
with local political culture; it can also obstruct the effective imple-
mentation of national goals. 
Because all institutional designs have the vices of their virtues, 
pluralist approaches have much to recommend them.  “Checks and 
balances” may be a hackneyed phrase that, like “federalism” or “sepa-
ration of powers,” often takes on positive or negative connotations 
depending upon its effect on substantive outcomes.  Yet, I cannot 
help but believe that the pluralistic approach to popular control of 
government action that has characterized American government 
from the very beginning has a deep wisdom.  Unitarianism has its vir-
tues, and popular control of bureaucratic elites is chief among them.  
But, presidential control has no unique claim to democratic legiti-
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macy, and the excesses of any form of popular control are perhaps 
best remedied by the competition of other visions of democracy, in-
stitutionalized in different ways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
